WANETS provide whenever-wherever networking amenities for communication establishment through the public wireless medium. In this environment, Secure-GKA and proficient group key management are known to be complicated tasks with respect to both computational and algorithmic points of view because of resource constraints in WANET [1] . There is an extensive range of applications for WANET which includes emergency medical services deployed in various environments which can considerably improve the quality of medical care; military applications, rescue missions, collaborative Abstract Group key agreement protocol permits a set of users to create a common key to make sure security of information exchange among members of the group. It is extensively used in secure multiparty computation, resource security sharing, and distributed collaborative computing etc. For large wireless ad-hoc network, there is no authentication center, the computing power and communication distance of terminals are constrained, and nodes frequently join and exit the network. For these reasons, Group Key Management for securing multicast communications in an energy-constrained large wireless ad-hoc network environment is still remains a critical and challenging issue. In this direction, we propose a cluster-based hybrid hierarchical-group key agreement (CHH-GKA) framework to provide a scalable solution for Secure Group Communication (SGC) in large wireless ad hoc networks (WANETs). This technique is based on splitting a large group into a certain number of clusters in which the last member of each of the clusters is designated as a cluster head (CH) and the last member of the group is designated as the group controller (GC). First we apply on hand Naresh-Murthy-group key agreement (NM-GKA) protocol locally in every cluster in parallel in level-I to generate CKs and then in level-II, the CHs' use these CKs and implement NM-GKA protocol again among them to form the complete group key. Finally each CH distributes the group key to all its members through their respective CK encrypted links. In this process, first we survey several cluster-based hierarchical GKA protocols and compare the proposed one with them and show that it provides optimal performance with regard to computation and communication expenses. Further, it also handles dynamic events and is provably secure in formal security model under the cryptographic suppositions. Naresh et al. Hum. Cent. Comput. Inf. Sci. (2019) is a tricky job due to its dynamism. A usual solution suggested to address this issue is to split up the large network into a certain number of constituent network clusters [12] . Categorization of the clustering algorithms can be done by the type of clusters they are forming. Several clustering algorithms pick special nodes as CHs, responsible for cluster creation and afterward-maintenance of the cluster [13] , at times routing also. The CHs are not always mandatory. A few protocols used in clustering algorithms do not use them at all. Instead, they prefer gateways to communicate messages from one cluster to another. A gateway generally fits to more than one cluster if there is an overlap in the clusters. In depth description relating to some of these clustering algorithms can be found, for example, in [14] .
dynamic events efficiently, (ii) a hybrid encryption is employed as this approach can reduce the computation overhead, and therefore, it is quite suitable for WSN. Some common drawbacks in the existing hierarchical protocols which include (i) the clustering method is not easy to handle certain member events, such as a CH node leaving the network. More precisely, it is rather costly to use the cluster method to deal with the situation that several CH nodes leave the network at the same time.
(ii) Distinct complex algorithms should be carefully designed for handling different kinds of dynamic events. On the other hand, as it was stated in [20, 21] , when every cluster are having the same amount of nodes and sizes, the hierarchical framework becomes fully balanced and also achieves the best performance. Besides, the authors of [21] asserted that the competence of the entire scheme is enriched if the amount of levels is little (let it be 3). In this work, a fully balanced hierarchical framework of level 2 was adopted with all the clusters with equal size except for one.
The proposed work has adopted hybrid based symmetric encryption where it combines the key distribution and key agreement. A digital signature scheme as in [16] can be used to authenticate our protocols. In view of the MANET's (Mobile Adhoc Network) dynamic, the proposed protocols adeptly address the dynamic events. It is designed exclusive of utilizing calculation-exhaustive pairings [22] and is extremely efficient relative to the existing hybrid cluster-based GKA protocols [20, [23] [24] [25] [26] [27] [28] [29] .
In contrast, usage and implementation of NM-GKA [16] protocol among all the nodes in the system may not be feasible for large WANETs. Consequently, we plan to use the same for each cluster and then for all the CHs in two levels hierarchically.
Notice that this paper assumes that the cluster structure has already been established (includes the amount of levels in the cluster hierarchy, formation of clusters [20, 21, 25, 26, [30] [31] [32] [33] and the selection of CHs) and thus does not consider overhead computation during the cluster-setup phase.
Related work
Two-party DH-key agreement [34] is the origin for enormous amount of consequent GKA schemes. The majority of distributed/contributory-GKA protocols rely on generalizations of 2-party DH or its extensions [3, 7, 16, [35] [36] [37] [38] [39] . Key management in distributed/contributory-GKA are less difficult to deal with in each subgroup/cluster compared to the whole ad hoc network. So most recent works [18, 20, 21, 25, 26, 30, 31, 35, 39, [40] [41] [42] adopted subgroup/cluster based approach, in which the whole group is divided into clusters. Distinct controllers are utilized to control every cluster which minimizes the issue of imposing the work on a single point.
The majority of CK-GKAs' [18, 20, 21, 25, 26, 30, 31, 35, 39, [40] [41] [42] presume a hierarchical framework of the clusters or hierarchical structure, then execute a natural key agreement schemes such as, D-H [34] or the Burmester and Desmedt (BD) [3] GKA scheme, or a variety GKA schemes [3, 7, 16, [35] [36] [37] [38] [39] is at first implemented locally in each cluster, after that utilize these CKs in the next level with equivalent or an alternate key agreement scheme among CHs' to generate the whole group key. For further information on a comparison of the existing protocols [18, 21, 25, 26, 28, 30, 31, 33, 43] in this direction, one can refer to Table 2 , summary of the key characteristics of cluster based protocols.
In the existing cluster-based GKA protocols, only [20, 26, 28, 31] offer authentication. Authentication confirms that only legitimate group members are allowed to derive the key in the key setup phase and accordingly facilitate the group members to secure against MITM attacks in the course of the key agreement phase. In the schemes [18, 21, 29] , the authors suggest an approach of making their scheme into an authenticated approach, but doesn't analyse the additional communication and computation cost in order to authenticate each and every message which is shared among the group members. Lastly, some protocols [25, 44] did not even consider the authentication mechanism at all in key agreement phase. On the other hand, these schemes can be altered in order to accomplish authentication by means of either a special kind of compiler or an authenticated GKA (AGKA) [45] .
Further, most of the traditional GKA schemes stated in the literature are unable to handle the dynamic nature (joining and leaving of nodes from the clusters) in WANETs. In precise, the renowned protocols in [3, 11, 36, 38] competent for wired networks, may not be applicable to the WANETs due to their enormous dynamism. On the other hand, clustering strategy empowers hubs to be sorted out in a various levelled ad hoc network dependent on their relative nearness to each other, along these lines debilitating the one hop presumption in natural GKA protocols.
After a thorough study in examined research area, in this work we adopted cluster based hybrid hierarchical approach: dynamic cluster-based hybrid hierarchical group key agreement for large wireless ad hoc networks.
Our contribution
The key objective of this work is to achieve "a provably secure CHH-GKA for large WANETs". The base behind the proposed creation is to divide and conquer. This protocol works by dividing larger group into a certain number of clusters created on their relative closeness to each another. For this we employ two types of keys namely group key (GK) and cluster key (CK). A CK is nothing but the key produced among every member inside a cluster and the GK is the complete network key among every node in the group.
In this work we choose dynamic authenticated NM-GKA protocol [16] for establishment of the CKs in level-I and then for GK in level-II. Further, the last member of each cluster will act as its CH and generates the CK among the cluster members in level-I. The last member of the group will act as the GC for the entire group and combines all the CKs to create the GK. Key for the entire group in level-II. This scheme reduces the computational complexity O(lr) to O(l + r) where l = Max (|C1|, |C2|,…,|Cr|) and "r" is the number of clusters.
For building provably secure model for the proposed protocol we adopted Bresson et al. 's [46] because it is the first formal provably secure model for authenticated GKA. The concept of provable security is utilized over the contemporary literature to demonstrate in a mathematical means, and under sensible suppositions, that a cryptographic technique accomplishes the essential goals of security. Such proofs are generally build by means of a formal setting that indicates: (1) the computing environment (involving cryptographic parameters, users, their trust association, communication etc.), (2) the adversarial environment and (3) the definitions of a few solid goals of security.
Overall contribution
i. The key contribution of this work is authenticated cluster-based hybrid hierarchical GKA: NM-CHH-GKA for large wireless ad hoc networks. ii. Extended NM-CHH-GKA to dynamic NM-CHH-GKA by proposing join and leave of single or multiple group members for membership changes. iii. Established recognized proofs of provable security for to dynamic NM-CHH-GKA. iv. Our comparative analysis assessed and measured the effectiveness of proposed protocol and compared with identified protocols in terms of energy cost for computation and communication and shown that the proposed protocol is optimal.
Some salient features of the proposed scheme i. Different CH are used to control each cluster and it minimizes the total load on a single point (GC).
For instance consider one of the most promising applications [24] of clusterbased hierarchical GKA over WSNs in the healthcare sector. NM-CHH-GKA over infrastructure-based WSN situation is appropriate for medical environments in which one can have numerous powerful nodes those can take CH role, such as intra-hospital environments. We can then suppose that CHs are predetermined and that consumption of energy is not a principal concern for them. The hospital sensor network can be split into various clusters by considering their geographical location. NM-CHH-GKA over infrastructure-less WSN situation is appropriate for medical environments in which there is no fixed infrastructure at all or no full coverage, as in the case of a medical emergency. In this situation, dynamically sensors can be clustered into non-overlapping or overlapping groups. Whenever a node wants to send out data, the node closer to the gateway (best path) is selected as the CH. For further information please refer [24] . ii. The failure of one CH or node doesn't affect the entire group. iii. Parallel computation of CKs provides reduced computational load from O(l·r) to O(l + r). iv. Both membership changes and subgroup dynamics can be optimally achieved. v. Local rekey: membership change in a cluster are treated locally, so that rekey of a cluster will not disturb the entire GK. vi. The two level cluster based hierarchical GKA scheme allows distributed key management scheme to implement at the cluster level to realize dynamism without losing efficiency. vii. The two level GKA reduces load on the GC by distributing or arranging the group members in the form of hierarchy, which enhances scalability and security. viii. Every cluster member requires a minimum storage space to preserve the CKs.
Organization/structure of the paper "Background protocols" section talks about the protocol's prerequisites. The proposed protocol is exhibited in "Proposed protocol" section. "Security analysis" section speaks about analysis of security. "Comparative analysis" section delivers a relative analysis with the existing prominent protocols. Finally, "Conclusion and future scope" section concludes with several observations and future scope.
Background protocols
Here first we introduce several notations presented during the course of the paper and then we present the backbone on hand NM-GKA protocol.
Notations
The several notations utilized in this paper are presented in Table 1 .
Naresh-Murthy group key agreement protocol (NM-GKA)
Let M 1 , M 2 ,…,M i ,…,M n be the members of group and let M n the last member be the GC. As shown in Fig. 1 , in round-1, the GC M n establishes (n − 1), 2-party ECDH common keys with every residual members. During round-2 the GC generates (n − 1) public keys L i by means of 2-party keys generated in round-1 after that it sends these public keys to the corresponding members and on getting, every member products it with their own common key in order to calculate the GK. Further the GC combines all the 2-party keys generated in round-1 into a GK and it turn into a part of the group. Authentication is provided with a digital signature (DSig) as in [16] . The NM.Initial group key agreement (NM.IGKA) protocol is presented in Fig. 1 . Further 
M i
The ith member of the group, 1 ≤ i ≤ n, where n the total group members
M n
The last member of the group is the group controller (GC)
C i
The ith cluster, 1 ≤ i ≤ r, where r = number of clusters
The CKs of C i , 1 ≤ i ≤ r
CK i
The ith updated CK for new cluster, 1 ≤ i ≤ r
M ij
The jth member of ith cluster,
The CH of ith cluster and the last member of that cluster
The M i 's private key, an integer belongs to [1,N − 1]
The M i 's public key 
Proposed protocol
Here we presented an outline of the proposed protocol and then the detailed proposed protocol.
Outline of the proposed scheme: NM-CHH-GKA
The proposed scheme consists of 4 steps as follows: Step 1: (Cluster key agreement) In this step parallel execution of NM-GKA protocol in all the clusters for computing their respective CKs as in Algorithm 1. call NM-Setup ( ) 3:
Choose share it to cluster Ci nodes 4: end for end Cluster_key_Agreement
Step 2: (Group key agreement) In this step execution of NM-GKA protocol among all the CHs for computing their complete GK as in Algorithm 2. group key 1: initialize GC to 2: for i =1 to r-1 do in parallel 2:
call NM-GKA( , GC) 3:
Choose share it to nodes 4: end for end Group_key_Agreement
Step 3: (Group key distribution among the cluster nodes) In this step each of the CH distributes the established GK in step-2 to their members through their respective CK encrypted links.
Algorithm 3: (Procedure group key distribution to cluster nodes):
Each CH encrypts the with their and broadcasts this within their cluster. Now every member of the cluster decrypts the message with its CK and gets the GK, . Group_Key _Cluster_Distribution() Input:
, 1 ≤ i ≤ r Cluster nodes, r: no of clusters, l: no of nodes in cluster 1: for i =1 to r do in parallel 2: Initialise to CH 3: for j =1 to l-1 do in parallel 4:
Encrypt ( and broadcast to 5: end for 6: for j =1 to l-1 do in parallel 7:
Decrypt(Encrypt ( to recover 8: end for 9:end for end Group_Key _Cluster_Distribution()
Step 4: (Group key maintenance) As per the dynamic nature of wireless nodes, the nodes' movement may vary the topology of network often. It is consequently significant and essential to update session key of the group to guarantee security. For establishing new GK, in level-1 we renew the CKs where changes in membership arise by call upon CK update as in Algorithm 4 and then in level-2 by invoking GK update as in Algorithm 5. 
NM-CHH-IGKA
Let M 1 , M 2 , M 3 …, M n be the group members. Without loss of generality, for computation sake, divide these "n" members into r = n l clusters, where cardinality of each cluster C 1 , C 2 , …, C r is less than or equal to l and also let the last member of each cluster act as CH and let the last member of entire group act as the GC for the whole group.
Level-I: CK generation for any of the cluster
Notice that the rth cluster may not have l members in it. However, the procedure remains the same with a different suffix other than l.
Step 1: The ith CH M i l forms (l − 1) two-party groups with the remaining members of that cluster M i 1 , M i 2 , . . . , M i l−1 and generates two-party ECDH style keys x K l,j , 1 ≤ j ≤ l − 1 as follows:
i. The CH M i l , chooses a private key x l and generates its public key X l = [x l ]P ii. Remaining cluster members M i j , 1 ≤ j ≤ l − 1, chooses private keys x j and generates their respective public keys X j = x j P, 1 ≤ j ≤ l − 1. iii. The CH broadcasts its public key X l to the remaining members of the cluster and each M i j , 1 ≤ j ≤ l − 1 unicasts X j to the CH M i l . iv. After exchanging their public key each member M i j in the cluster C i , computes its shared key K l,j with the CH M i l as follows:
v. Similarly, the CH M i l computes (l − 1) shared keys K l,j with the remaining cluster members M i j , 1 ≤ j ≤ l − 1 as follows:
shared keys between the CH M i l and other members M i j of the cluster C i , where 1 ≤ i ≤ r and 1 ≤ j ≤ l in that order.
Step 2: Currently the CH calculates the (l − 1) public keys L j , using two-party common keys x K l,j , 1 ≤ j ≤ l − 1 established in step 1, as below and sends it to respective M i j .
Public keys:
After unicast messages are received by respective members M i j compute the CKs as under:
As CH be acquainted with all the common keys, it also establishes the CK as under: Thus x s is the CK among the cluster members C i . Now, let the CK of C i be x s i , 1 ≤ i ≤ r. Level-II: Let M 1 l , M 2 l , . . . , M r−1 l , M r l be the CHs and let M r l = M n be the GC.
Step 1: Let x s i be the CK of the respective cluster C i , 1 ≤ i ≤ r generated in level-I. First the GC M r l forms (r − 1) 2-party groups with the residual CHs and each CH M i l takes the CKs generated in level-I x s i , 1 ≤ i ≤ r as their private key respectively and computes their respective public keys as follows:
The GC, M r l broadcasts its public key S r to the remaining CHs M i l , 1 ≤ i ≤ r − 1. After receiving each CH M i j computes the shared key between GC and itself as follows:
Each CH M i l , unicasts its public key x s i to GC M r l and then GC computes the (r − 1) shared keys with the remaining CHs as follows: Thus x T r,i 1 ≤ i ≤ r − 1 are the (r − 1) common keys between the GC M r l and the other CHs M i l , where 1 ≤ i ≤ r − 1.
Step 2: Currently the GC calculate the (r − 1)-public keys U i , by means of two party common keys x T r,i , 1 ≤ i ≤ r − 1, generated in step 1, and sends it to respective CHs M i l 1 ≤ i ≤ r − 1 as follows:
After receiving respective unicast messages, respective CHs M i l compute the GKs as follows:
T r,i = x s r S i = x s r x s i P = x s r x s i P = x T r,i , y T r,i , 1 ≤ i ≤ r − 1.
In view of the fact that the GC knows every common key, it also generates the GK as under:
Hence the x K is the GK among the group members. Authentication is provided with a digital signature (DSig) as in [16] .
NM-dynamic CCH protocol (NM-DCHH)
To address the dynamic events such as join and leave in GKA we proposed a NM-DCCH-GKA by introducing NM-CHH.Join protocol and NM-CHH.Leave protocol as follows:
NM-CHH.Join protocol
The principal security prerequisite of member joining is the protection of the earlier GK from both the outsiders and the newly joining group members.
Suppose a node or a set of nodes U wish to join the group and intimates the same to GC. The GC adds U at the beginning of the cluster C i where it belongs so that the CH remains the same. We proceed with NM-CHH-Join protocol as shown in Fig. 4 .
NM-CHH.Leave protocol
The principal security prerequisite when a member leaves is the protection of the succeeding (future) GK from both the outsiders and the earlier leaving group nodes.
We may assume that this member is not a CH without loss of generality, because if it is the GC and/or CH, naturally the preceding member will act as GC and/or CH and the procedure still remains the same.
Suppose a node or a set of nodes U want to leave the group and intimates the same to GC. We proceed with NM-CHH-Leave protocol shown in Fig. 5 . 
Security analysis
Here we presented the security of (i) unauthenticated protocol ( Proof The verification regard as an opponent A who overcomes the security of proposed unauthenticated static NM-CHH scheme. Given A , we build an enemy B assaulting the symmetric encryption plot (Symm); identifying with the achievement likelihood Notice that r + 1 clusters are required in the network, in each execution of proposed protocol to form the GK:
i. The execution of NM-GKA protocol simultaneously for r clusters in level-I. ii. The execution of the NM-GKA protocol among the r CHs in level-II. iii. Symmetric encryption scheme: Symm for distributing the key among the clusters with respect to given CKs.
The opponent A performs q E execute queries and accordingly carry out r · q E executions of NM-GKA scheme in level-I and 1 · q E executions of NM-GKA protocol in level-II respectively. Consequently performs a total of (r + 1)q E . 
Now,
Note that ever call upon its encrypting oracle E. Furthermore, the B 's running time is at most t.
As Adv B,Symm ≤ Adv Symm (t, 0, 0), by assumption.
where |P m | = maximum amount of clusters in the network = r +1 Hence by Lemma 4.1, we realize the theorem. □
We now present the security of the NM-ACHH in which the security is depends on that of unauthenticated schemes relied on fact that DSig (signature scheme) is secure.
Theorem 4.3 The authenticated CHH scheme (NM-ACHH) is secure in opposition to active opponent under Elliptic Curve-Decision Diffie Hellman (EC-DDH) supposition, accomplishes forward secrecy and outputs the following:
where t ′ = t + (|P|q E + q S )t ACHH , with t ACHH is the time needed for carrying out of NM-ACHH by each of the party, q S and q E are respectively the maximum amount of Send and Execute query an opponent may pose.
Proof Let A ′ be a opponent ambushing the AP. With this we construct an enemy A attacking the UP.
We initially confine the likelihood of the event Forge that A ′ outputs an authentic forge w.r.t publickey pk i for some client M i ∈ P before making the question corrupt (M i ).
Claim Let Forge be the incident that a signature of Dsig is forged by A ′ then
Proof A ′ prepares a signature forger F to challenge Dsig-scheme. The aim of F preparation is that, when a publickey PK is given as input, F has permission to a signing oracle using PK, which generates a legitimate forgery (m, σ), i.e., γ PK (m, σ ) = 1 ∋ σ was not previously output by the signing oracle as a signature over m. The F chooses a client M f ∈ at random, and sets PK ƒ to the PK. For left over members, F legitimately generates key pair (private key, public key) by executing GKA protocol. In addition, F carryout the method, necessary for Initiating UP. At this moment F carryout A ′ as a subprogram ∈ simulated queries from A ′ are as below:
• Execute (M)/Reveal π s i /Dump π s i /Test π s i : these questions are answered in an obvious manner.
• Send π s i , m : every private keys of M i are aware to F when i ≠ ƒ, then, respond to queries subsequent to the particular protocol specifically. Conversely if i = ƒ, then every M ′ i 's signing keys are unrecognized by F Incidentally, F can acquire message signature it needs by accomplishment to signing oracle related to PK.
• Corrupt (M i ). If i ≠ ƒ, F principally holds M ′ i 's private keys stands for long period, created itself. On the other hand if A ′ corrupts M i = M ƒ , then, F terminates and returns "fail".
The displayed above simulation is marvelously ill defined from the authentic execution except if enemy A ′ represents the query corrupt (M ƒ ). All the way through this simulation, F glances each send question from A ′ , and keeps an eye in the unlikely event that it fuses an authentic pair (m, σ) using PK. If no such inquiry is posed till A ′ ends, at that point F closures and returns "fail". Else, F generates (m, σ) as real fraud w.r.t PK. Lemma 3 straight forwardly inferred from the manner in which the second case occurs with likelihood pγ[Forge]/n.
Currently we portray the improvement of attacking UP, that utilizes A ′ ambushing AP. A uses tlist and keep (session Ids, transcripts) in it. A makes (verification keys (pk M ), signing keys (sk M )) for each customer M ∈ P and check keys are given to A ′ . At the point when the event Forge occurs, A rashly closures and outputs an arbitrary bit. Else, outputs a similar bit whatever A ′ outputs. A can recognize occasion of the event Forge A ′ in light of the fact that it knows sk M and pk M . The oracle questions of A ′ are imitated by A using its inquiries to the Execute Oracle (EO). The motto is to procure a transcript (T) of UP for every single Execute question of A ′ . Besides for every one beginning send question, send 0 Reveal/test queries (R Q/T Q): Suppose A ′ asks the RQ (M, i) or TQ (M, i) to an incident π i M for which acc i M = 1. . Currently the T' in which π i M took part has been predefined. Now first finds an sole entry (S,T) in the tlist ∋ (M, i) ∈ S. Imagine that, forge doesn't occur, T is sole unauthenticated transcript which is related to T′. Now asks proper RQ or TQ to any occasion incorporated in T and hand over a proportional payback to A ′ is just right. When Forge occurs, opponent A terminates and outputs an arbitrary bit.
A asks an EQ in line with each EQ of A ′ . Similarly poses an EQ in all sessions underway by A ′ . Because, session consist of at least two instances, such as EQ is processed We currently present the security of dynamic authenticated protocol (DAP): (NM-DACHH). Expecting that, DSig is secure, we can change over any enemy assaulting convention DAP into a opponent assaulting convention UP. We disregard Corrupt queries since our convention DAP does not utilize any long-time secret keys. Along these lines convention DAP obviously accomplishes forward secrecy.
Theorem 4.4 The dynamic authenticated CHH scheme (NM-DACHH) depicted in "Proposed protocol" section fulfils the following:
where t ′ = t + (|P|q E + q J + q l + q S )t DACHH , with t AHP is the time needed for carrying out of DACHH by each of the party q E , q S q J , q L are in that order the maximum amount of Execute, Send, Join and Leave queries an opponent may pose.
Proof Let A ′ be an opponent who tries to attack DAP. By means of this we build an opponent A who assaults UP. As in the preceding proof, we had the following claim.
Claim Let Forge be the incident, that A ′ forged the signature, then
At the moment we present the creation of the passive opponent A assaulting UP that utilizes opponent A ′ assaulting DAP. Opponent A can implement the UP numerous times, among every subset of Ƥ and can acquire session key of scheme implementation by producing a RQ to any occurrence concerned in session. Now we demonstrate that A simulates itself Leave and Join questions of A ′ utilizing its own Reveal Oracles (ROs) and EOs. Opponent A ′ keeps up a Tlist to store sets of session IDs and transcripts. It likewise utilizes two records Llist and Jlist to be determined in future.
Opponent A creates signing/confirmation key pair (pkU, skU) for every client U ∈ Ƥ and gives confirmation keys to A ′ . If at any time the occasion Forge happens, opponent A prematurely ends and outputs an arbitrary bit. Else, A outputs no matter what bit is in the long run yield by A ′ . Since the signing and confirmation keys, it can identify event of occasion Forge. A reproduces the oracle inquiries of A ′ utilizing its own questions to the ROs and EOs. We present particulars below.
EQs': these queries are replicated in Theorem 4.2 proof.
1 ≤ j ≤ m. A ′ discovered an entry of the form (S, S 2 , T′) in Llist. If no such entry, then the opponent A ′ is doesn't give any output. Else, A returns T′ to A ′ . Reveal/Test (R/T) queries: assume A ′ sends the RQ(M, i) or TQ(M, i) for an occurrence Π i M for which acc i M = 1. . At this moment the transcript T′ in which Π i M take part has been predefined. If T′ related to the transcript of the AP then A ′ discovers the sole pair (S, T) in Tlist such that (M, i) ∈ S. Supposing that the occasion Forge does not occur, T is the sole unauthenticated transcript which relates to the transcript T′. Then sends the suitable RQ or TQ to one of the occasions concerned in T and returns the result to A ′ . Else, T′ is the transcript for Join or Leave, as the case may be. Because T′ has been simulated by A , is capable to calculate the updated session key and hence send an appropriate reply to A ′ .
Providing Forge doesn't occur, the above simulation for A ′ is perfect. At the time Forge occurs, opponent A terminates and outputs a arbitrary bit.
So
. By means of this, one can prove
The opponent A sends an EQ for every EQ of A ′ . A ′ poses q J , JQs and q L , LQs. These inquiries are commenced respectively by Send J and Send L inquires of A ′ . Currently every Send J and Send L inquiry of A ′ poses at most one EQ of. Consequently there are at most q J + q L EQs posed by A to reply all the Send J and Send L inquiries of A ′ . Also A poses an EQ for every session commenced by A ′ by means of SQs. Because a session engages at least two occurrences, such an EQ is prepared after at least two SQs of A ′ . Consequently there are (q S − q J − q L )/2 EQs of A to react to all other SQs of A ′ , where q S is the amount of SQs prepared by A ′ . Consequently the total amount of EQs posed by is at most
where q E is the amount of EQs posed by A ′ . Furthermore since
This implies the statement of the theorem. □
Comparative analysis
Here the proposed ECDH-based NM-clustering-based hybrid hierarchical group key agreement (NM-CHH-GKA) protocol has been compared with prevalent clustering based GKA protocols such as HKAP [25] , GKA-CH [21] , PB-GKA-HGM [31] , AP-1/ AP-2 [33] , ACEKA [26] , A-DTGKA [20] , ACBGKA [18] , ECDH-SKDM [43] and NMsetup [16] with regard to various characteristics such as pre required GKA protocol used, structure and limitations are in Table 2 . Further we compare the proposed one with them in terms of communication and computational complexities in Table 3 .
Here Let the amount of nodes be "n" and choose l = √ n be the amount of clusters members such that l ≪ r and the amount of clusters r = n/l Grants the geographic revamping of members without setting off a key-revive each time a user be in motion starting with one cluster then onto the next GKA-CH [21] No BD convention [12] in each layer of a roundabout various levelled group structure The group is prearranged in "h" hierarchical layers encompassed by one/more clusters organized in a circle
All clusters have the same size PB-GKA-HGM [31] Yes A password-based convention is implemented in every cluster Constructs a level wise tree structure using 3 entities:
the chief controller C in peak layer, different CHs S i and several members (CM) in each cluster Each CM ought to have a password and a pair wise secret key imparted to the CH. Each CH ought to hold a password and a pair wise secret key imparted to the GC. Passwords and secret keys are preloaded into hubs AP-1 [33] Yes A variant of the BD scheme called DB [7] is used for CKs as well as GK A CH is chosen from each of the cluster to take part in the creation of the complete GK Communication between CHs should be one hop AP-2 [33] Yes The CK are established using DB protocol and for GKDBS [37] is used
CHs are prearranged in a tree structure, which facilitates proficient management of dynamic membership alterations The GKA implemented in AP-2 is pairing-based, which raises the cost of computation and the entire complexity of the scheme ACEKA [26] Yes D-H and Joux's tripartite key agreement [35] From Table 3 , it follows that the proposed protocol is optimal with reference to communication and computation expenses, facilitating the equal level of security with fewer key sizes. Further the proposed protocol is shown to be optimal for secure GKA over resource constrained networks like WSN and Mobile Ad hoc Networks (MANETS) and among ECDLP/DLP-based protocols confer in this paper.
With the end goal to acquire a improved guess for the energy cost of computation and communication for the scheme presented in this paper, we ascertained its energy utilization for a particular sensor. Particularly, we pick a sensor network involved by Tmote Sky gadgets by Texas Instruments with a most extreme 100 kbps data rate. As per [47] a sensor hub relied on the 133 MHz Strong ARM chip devours 8.8 mJ for a scalar multiplication and 47.0 mJ for a paring. Concerning the cost of communication, a 100 kbps radio handset module devours 10.8 μJ and 7.51 μJ for the communication gathering of one bit of information in that order.
For GKA scheme we utilize its EC-analog and in this manner suppose that the traded messages has the size of an EC-point. In the event that we utilize a 160-bit EC, the extent of its points (x, y) will be 320 bits. We would then be able to figure the expense for the reception and transmission by multiplying energy cost with its size in bits for the reception and transmission of a single bit. Table 4 outlines a scalar multiplication's energy costs, a pairing calculation and a reception and transmission of a message utilizing the specific gadget (Tmote Sky) and radio handset module of speed the 100 kbps.
From Table 3 the total amount of Sequential Scalar Multiplications and Messages if we use NM-GKA [16] protocol among all the nodes in the system are 2(l · r), 2(l · r − 2) which may not be feasible for large WANETs. Consequently, we plan to use the same for each of the "r" cluster of "l" nodes each in parallel in level-I and then for all the "r" CHs in level-II hierarchically to establish the GK so the proposed protocol uses total amount of Sequential Scalar Multiplications and Messages 2(l + r) , 2(l + r − 2 ) only.
Computational complexities using graphs
Figures 6, 7 and 8 indicates comparison on computational energy cost of proposed NM-CHH-GKA protocol with reference to number of nodes for establishing GK and shown that the proposed one is the optimal when compared to the other protocols. So the proposed NM-CHH-GKA works with lower computational cost and better efficiency when compared to existing protocols. So It is suitable for recourse constrained networks such as WANETS.
Communication complexities using graphs
Figures 9, 10 and 11 indicates comparison on communication energy cost of proposed NM-CHH-GKA protocol with reference to number of nodes for establishing GK and shown that the proposed one is the optimal when compared to the other protocols. So the proposed NM-CHH-GKA works with relatively low communication overheads and greater competence when compared to existing protocols. So It is fitting for recourse embarrassed networks such as WANETS.
Experimental results
For Experimentation Linux environment was used running on a system with configuration 2.4 GHz Celeron(R) CPU with 512 MB of memory. A NS-2 simulator was used to establish a hierarchical arrangement of nodes in tree topology format. A Crypt++ Library 5.2.1 was utilized to implement NM-CHH-GKA scheme, different libraries were used to develop algorithms for the key sharing, encryption and decryption algorithm. NS-2 libraries were used to establish the TCP connection and communication among the nodes to share the packets (max 1000 bytes), to support multicasting or unicasting in the derivation of key as well as data sharing. For each examination, we ran the protocol for 10 times and calculate the average computation times for different operations such as level-I group formulation, level-II group formulation, Computation of K i,j values, Computation of L i values, Computation of individual CKs SKi/CK i computation, and GK with the following tabulated NS-2 parameters in Table 5 .
Experimental results for computational times
Let the quantity of members be "n" and choose l = √ n number of cluster members such that l < r and r = n/l . We presented the experimental results for computational time with respect to amount of nodes, quantity of clusters; quantity of members in a cluster are tabulated in detail in Table 6 . Further we present the experimental comparative analysis between NM-Setup and NM-CHH Setup in Table 7 . Fig. 16 . Figure 12 indicates comparison between setup time for GKA in level-I and level-II. We can observe that setup time in both levels NM-CHH-GKA are mostly same because we are using same NM.Setup in both levels. Figure 13 indicates comparison between computation time of member and cluster head in level-I. We can observe that the computation load on cluster head is relatively higher than individual members in level-I of NM-CHH-GKA. Figure 14 indicates comparison between Computation time of cluster head as a Member and Group Head in level-II. We can observe that the computation load on Group Head is relatively higher than individual cluster head in NM-CHH-GKA. Figure 15 indicates comparison of computation time among individual Member, Cluster Head, Group Head in Entire GK Generation. We can observe that the computation load on Group Head is relatively higher than individual cluster head which is relatively higher than individual members in NM-CHH-GKA. Figure 16 indicates comparison of computation time between NM.Setup and NM-CHH-GKA. We can observe that the computational load on NM-CHH-GKA is highly reduced relative to NM.Setup by splitting large group into a certain number of clusters.
The findings in "Computational complexities using graphs", "Communication complexities using graphs" and "Experimental results" sections are the complexities of NM-CHH-GKA in the context of computation, communication and experimental results respectively when compared to existing protocols. From these sections we can conclude that our protocol is optimal with respect to all the three dimensions. So NM-CHH-GKA is suitable for recourse constrained networks such as WANETS.
Conclusion and future scope
In this paper a new scalable NM-CHH GKA protocol was proposed based on parallel computing for large dynamic groups with less computational capabilities. Novel architectural design of our protocol provides flexibility and reduces cryptographic workload. The two level NM-CHH-GKA scheme allows on hand NM-GKA scheme to implement at cluster level to achieve scalability and robustness without sacrificing efficiency. The advantage of hierarchical management includes freeing the group controller looking after several members, enhancing security, improving scalability together with all cluster requiring minimal space for dealing with protocol. As a key management technique, proposed protocol uses cluster-based hybrid hierarchical scheme reducing rekeying workload of the networks while limiting the failure to local cluster without affecting other clusters. Comparative analysis showed that proposed protocol provides better performance in view of both communication and computation expenses. Further we established a formal security model for the proposed NM-CHH-GKA under cryptographic assumptions.
Security of CHH-GKA in WANETs is inadequate in the presence of node misbehaviour and internal attacks. It is because an opponent may start security attacks with the security keys obtained from compromised nodes. To isolate misbehaving node from legitimate data transmission as a future scope we plan to integrate trust enhanced module using Fuzzy Trust Based rules to NM-CHH GKA to develop a trust enhanced secure clustering framework for WANETs.
